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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
case, in an attempt to conciliate the decisions, threw out a hint which may
not only reconcile past decisions but may act as a guiding principle in fu-
tur decisions.7 The court stated that where the doctrine has been applied
something more than the bare accident and injury has been alleged. Always
some affirmative act of the defendant has been alleged which, coupled with
the injury, has served to raise the inference of negligence. Whatver may
be said of this principle as an operative rule, it does come close to harmoniz-
ing the opinions which has gone before. All of the cases applying the doc-
trine contained allegations of affirmative acts by the defendants which sug-
gested negligence, as where a turn was made at too low and unsafe a speed
and altitude, or where planes crashed in mid-air.8 With one exception,O the
cases where the doctrine was refused did not contain allegations over and
above the accident and injury.'0 The exception refused the doctrine al-
though all the circumstances seemed to demand it, but the plaintiff did not
rely a great deal on the doctrine and failed to save his exceptions when it
was not applied.
It would not seem unfair to put this burden on the plaintiff. In most
cases the plaintiff would be capable of inserting allegations of this sort in
his petition, where he would not be capable of alleging sufficient specific acts
to enable him to win the case under the general rules of negligence. The
allgations would have to be made with caution, the amount of caution de-
pending on the jurisdiction, because allegations of too specific a nature may
cause the plaintiff to lose the advantages of the doctrine altogether. A
Texas court refused the plaintiff the use of the doctrine on the ground that
he had alleged too many specific facts and therefore would have to stand
on the specific allegations." B. T. '38.
PHYSICIANS AND SUnoEONS--'REPUTABLn' MEDICAL COLLEGE-DUE PRO-
CESS-ADMINIsTRATVE ORDERS.-A Wisconsin statute authorizes the State
Board of Medical Examiners to "license without examination a person hold-
ing a license to practice medicine and surgery. .. in another state, ...
upon presentation of the license and a diploma from a reputable profes-
sional college."' The statute does not specify any procedure whereby the
Board can determine whether a particular medical college is in fact reput-
able. In that state of the law, the Board refused a license to an applicant
who had graduated from a school not recognized by the Board as fulfilling
the statutory requirements of reputability. In arriving at that decision, the
7 Herndon v. Gregory (1935 Ark.) 81 S. W. (2d) 849.
8 Seaman v. Curtis Wright Flying Service (1930) 247 N. Y. Supp. 251;
McClusker v. Curtis Wright Flying Service (1933) 269 Ill. App. 502; Smith
v. O'Donnell (1932) 215 Calif. 714, 12 P. (2d) 933; Stoll v. Curtis Wright
Flying Service Inc. (1930) U. S. Aviation Rep. 148.
9 Allison v. Standard Air Lines, supra note 5.
10 Wilson v. Colonial Air Lines, supra note 5; Herndon v. Gregory, supra
note 5.
"English v. Miller (1931 Tex.) 43 S. W. (2d) 642. For, Missouri rule
Kennedy v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. (1907) 128 Mo. App. 297, 107 S. W. 16.
'Wis. Stats. (1935) 147. 17.
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Board had duly notified both the applicant and the medical college (The
Chicago Medical School), and conducted a hearing upon the matter, allow-
ing members of the medical faculty to testify as to the sort of instruction
given by them. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided, in a mandamus
action by the applicant against the Board, that the procedure used was ade-
quate to the Board's rendering a valid decision on the point.2
The Supreme Court relied on its statement in a former case, "Since it
(the law) requires the board to pass upon the reputability of the school in
circumstances like those in this case, and places no limit upon the methods
by which it shall gather information bearing on the subject for decision,
it may proceed in any reasonable way, and candidates for licenses must sub-
mit to its judgments unless they transgress the boundaries of reason and
common sense." 3 In that case, the petitioner contended that the Board had
acted arbitrarily by finding the Wisconsin College of Physicians and Sur-
geons irreputable it simply relied on his holding of a year before without
any intervening investigation. The case showed that there was an addi-
tional examination of the school in the meantime, and that the petitioner's
evidence failed to show an abuse of discretion.
These two cases lead directly into a third set of facts, carefully distin-
guished from those of the instant case by the opinion of the Court. Such
a situation is presented by State ex 'rel. Milwaukee Medical College v. Chit-
tenden et al., State Dental Board, the facts of which shows that the Board
had recognized the medical school's dental department, but later found it
not to be reputable.4 But in arriving at the latter decision, the Board had
not given any notice or opportunity to be heard to the Milwaukee College.
There the Court held that due process had been denied the College. The
effect of these decisions is that once recognition has been given, it is neces-
sary to have notice and hearing, before the Board may declare a school dis-
reputable but only a reasonable determination by the Board is necessary in
the first instance.
The case at hand is a very recent one; the other two are older. This case
involves a situation arising on reciprocity, the other two do not. That dis-
tinction gives a definite clue to simplifying the whole matter of reputability
in the future. In an early case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld
the constitutionality of a statute giving the Board power to license grad-
uates of medical schools located within the state without examination. The
Court pointed out that the distinction was a reasonable one, inasmuch as
there might be an actual difference between those schools located within the
state, and those without, and because the Wisconsin legislature could regu-
late those within the state.5 Hence, by virtue of this decision, the legisla-
ture could simply define as reputable those schools located within the state.
As to the situation presented by applicants from other states, the matter
2 State ex rel. Blank v. Gramling et al (1935) 262 N. W. 614.
3 State ex rel Coffey v. Chittenden et al (1902) 112 Wis. 569, 88 N. W.
587.
4 (1906) 127 Wis. 468, 107 N. W. 500.
I State ex rel Kellogg v. Currans (1901) 111 Wis. 431, 87 N. W. 561.
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could be left entirely to the Board's discretion. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota sums up the matter thus: "Reciprocity and comity import the
granting of a favor, which conception of itself would seem to negative the
right to complain of its denial, except where such right is clearly given."'0
Then, too, administrative discretion would have considerable free play as
to schools within the state, it having been determined in Missouri that quo
warranto would lie against a medical school not recognized by the Board,
7
and in Ohio that the Board was the proper agency to determine in the first
instance if a medical college was not reputable, and hence carrying on its
activities contrary to its charter.8 In this manner, a state could leave con-
siderable power to administrative discretion, prevent unqualified persons
moving from state to state without sufficient examination, and relieve the
courts of passing on the technical questions raised in determining the suffi-
ciency of a medical course. W. H. lM. '36.
TAXATION-BANK DEPosrrs-DuE P0CEsss.-Appellant company was or-
ganized in Delaware. It maintained there, through the Corporation Service
Co., a duplicate set of books in fulfillment of the laws of that state. The
company's plants were located in Ohio, and its principal business offices
were in Wheeling, West Virginia, from which office all contracts were ap-
proved, checks received and deposited, and in which the Directors' meetings
-were held. West Virginia imposed an ad valorem property tax on bank
deposits in the state. In an action brought to recover the tax paid under
protest it was held, that the tax did not violate the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Wheeling Steel Co. V. Fox.1
It is well settled that a state may not tax any property not within its
jurisdiction without violating the due process clause.2 The rule is estab-
lished that a state may tax tangibles permanently located within its boun-
daries.3 The courts have applied the maxim nobilia sequuntur personam
in determining the situs of intangibles for the purpose of taxation.4 The
courts have felt that this maxim affords protection against multiplied tax-
ation.5 This fact was strikingly illustrated in the case of Burnett v.
Brooks.6 There the decedent, a subject of great Britain and a resident of
Cuba, left stocks and bonds in a New York bank. The court held that for
the purpose of taxation the United States had jurisdiction and applied the
maxim as between the states thereby avoiding the hardship of possible
double taxation.
6 Wililams v. Minnesota State Board of Medical Examiners (1913) 120
Minn. 313, 139 N. W. 500.
7 State v. St. Louis College of Physicians and Surgeons (Mo. 1927) 295
S. W. 537.
8 State v. Hygeia Medical College (1899) 60 Ohio St. 122, 54 N. E. 86.
1 (May 18, 1936) 3 U. S. Law Week 959; 56 S. Ct. 773.
2Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota (1930) 280 U. S. 204.
3 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky (1905) 199 U. S. 194.
4 Blodgett v. Silberman (1928) 277 U. S. 1.5 Supra, note 2.
6 (1933) 288 U. S. 378.
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